


# Pointing the Finger at Contaminated Food



Bill Keene Oregon Public Health Division










#### Range of Foodborne Illnesses


- gastroenterititis many
- birth defects toxoplasmosis
- abortion/stillbirth listeriosis
- septicemia V. vulnificus
- respiratory failure botulism
- 📕 kidney failure 🛛 🗧 E. coli O157

- seizures taeniasis
- amnesia domoic acid
- paralysis campylobacteriosis
- dementia nvCJD/TSE



# **Disease Reporting**

- Rules are state-specific
- Specific diseases, outbreaks, and "unusual diseases" are reportable
- (Some) isolates go to PHL for subtyping
- Generally, no identifiers go to feds



# **Sporadic Case Investigation Questions**

- Basic demographics
- Basis of diagnosis
- Hot-button exposure(s)
- ldentify others at risk
- Health education and individual control measures
  (e.g., child care, school, food handler restrictions)

CASE IDENTIFICATIO	N				// case repo	0 P
NameNU, top, tops			Thome(s)	an we ji wi K. wa	Physician	EPORT (check al fection Control P
ALTERNATIVE CONTACT: Dra	rent 🗆 Spouse	Household Member		ude horse (F) and (N) reco	e-in Primary M.D	Date
Address	Unknows	American Indian Aalary/Recific Islander		is 	Phone	0K1 50.0
or, if arknown, AGE BASIS OF DIAGNOSIS	HISPANIC	no 🗆 unknown	Uccup	con, pior _		
Spreysmant     Cyres     Chail     Chail		gptode pusitive:ms mare continues:ms statemen collected/ anomena to PHK,pers N 		associated with a close contact or presurgifie con- Has the above Specify nature house	r? I case been reported?	Dyes Division

#### O157: Possible Food Exposures

- Undercooked/raw meat
- ANY ground beef
- food at restaurants
- **food** at other gatherings (potlucks, events)
- dried meat (salami, jerky, etc.)
- unpasteurized milk and cheese
- venison or other game
- sprouts (alfalfa, clover, bean, ...)
- unpasteurized juice or cider

# **O157: Other Potential Exposures**


work exposure to human/animal excreta

- contact with diapered children
- water recreation
- hunting; contact with deer, elk, etc.
- livestock or farm exposure
- petting zoos
- travel




# **Ongoing Review of Data**

- Comparisons with other time periods, other locations
- Assessment of demographic and basic risk factor information
- Integration with lab subtyping data
- Detection of anomalies (e.g., outbreaks)










- What Starts Outbreak Investigations?
- Citizen reports
- Physician reports
- Space/time concentration of case reports
- Isolate subtyping




## Lab Characterization of Enteric Bugs

 Bacteria speciation serotyping (e.g., Salmonella Heidelberg, S. Agona) serogrouping (e.g., Escherichia coli O157:H7)
PFGE MLVA

Viruses Norovirus testing sequencing for hepatitis A, norovirus

Ρι	ulse	d F	ielo	d Gel	Elect	rophor	esis	(PFC	θE	)
Dice (Opt1.50%) (Tr	N 1 5% 1 5%) (Hon)	0% \$>0.0%) ID0	96-100.0961							
PFGE-Xbal	PFGE									
0 0	0									
0 0 	Lă .			1.1101		G09-0052	2009-01-20	Washington	OR	Humar
		ii	ii.	1 1781	111 11	G09-0053	2009-01-20	Multnomah	OR	Humar
		11	1			상 G09-0062	2009-01-22	Washington	OR	Humar
	_	- 11	-			000-1200	2008-12-30	Clackamas	OR	Humar
		11	1	1.111	111	G08-1189	2008-12-01	Unknown	NV	Humar
		11	1	111		G08-1194	2008-11-25	Crook	OR	Humai
		í í	- Ē	í ííí i	10.10	G08-1175	2008-11-24	Morrow	OR	Humar
	1	11	1	11.11		G08-1180	2008-11-25	Baker	OR	Humar
		11	1	1111	11 331	G08-1210	2008-12-08	Baker	OR	Humai
200		11	1	111	114011	G09-0020	2009-01-08	Lane	OR	Humai
			1	111	111111	G09-0032	2009-01-12	Clackamas	OR	Huma
			1	111	1111111	G09-0034	2009-01-13	Washington	OR	Humai
			1	11 11	11011	G09-0044	2009-01-15	Clackamas	OR	Humai
	-	11	1	1111	1110 1 1	G09-0051	2009-01-20	Jackson	OR	Humai
	~		1		11111	४ G09-0056	2009-01-21	Yamhill	OR	Humai
	_	1.11				609-0057	2009-01-21	Yamhill	OR	Anima
	-	11	11	1 11 1		G08-1222	2008-12-11	Unknown	OR	Anima
		1 1	1	1 110	1,11111	G08-1240	2008-12-19	Washington	OR	Humar
	L.	1 1	1	1 111	1 11 11 1	G09-0033	2009-01-13	Washington	OR	Humar
	-	1 1	1			G09-0024	2009-01-12	Washington	OR	Humar



# Why Investigate Outbreaks?

- Stop ongoing transmission (in short term)
- Facilitate diagnosis and proper treatment or prophylaxis
- Identify risk factors
- Stimulate research
- Develop sensible prevention strategies

Brand X ice cream linked to 1994 salmonellosis outbreak—~250,000 cases




# Outbreak Investigations are Disproportionately Important


- Specific sources can be identified
- Risk factors can be confirmed
- Media interest provides opportunities for public health communication
- Tort damages, loss of sales, and damage to brand names get industry's attention
- Political interest is stimulated

















# **Recent Multi-State Outbreaks**

year	pathogen	vehicle	Oregon
2008	S. Typhimurium	peanut stuff	12
2008	S. Agona	unknown	6
2008	S. Poona	unknown	1
2008	E. coli O157:H7	spinach	6
2008	S. Saintpaul	jalapeños, serranos	11
2008	S. Typhimurium	spouts	7
2008	S. Litchfield	cantaloupe	5
2007	S. I 4,[5],12:i:-	pot pies	10
2007	E. coli O157:H7	ground beef	2
2007	S. Wandsworth	Veggie Booty	4
2007	S. Montevideo	sprouts	1
2007	S. Tennessee	peanut butter	3
2006	E. coli O157:H7	spinach	5
2006	S. Ohio	baby chicks	4



# **Outbreak Investigation Processes**

- Recognition of the cluster
- Hypothesis generation
- Identification of source (hypothesis testing)
- Traceback/trace forward
- Short-term interventions
- Identification of "cause"
- Long-term interventions

# Hypothesis Generation

- Demographic characterization
- Distribution of cases in space and time
- Historical precedents
- Case histories
- Outlier cases
- Systematic interview data



# Review of Basic Data

# No obvious connections or "hot-button" exposures reported

Age	Sex	Onset	County
27	F	8/25/06	Marion
37	М	8/25/06	Cowlitz (WA)
17	F	8/30/06	Benton
62	F	8/31/06	Linn


# Shotgun Interviews

[12] <b>Y</b>	?	Ν	FRESH VEGETABLES 2
Α□			white or yellow onions
в 🗖			green onions (scallions)
с 🗆			leeks
D 🗖			eggplant
Ε 🗖			commercially made guacamole
F 🗖			other avocado
G 🗖			cabbage
н 🗆			bean sprouts
/ 🗆			any stir-fry that might have included bean sprouts
J 🗖			alfalfa sprouts
К 🗖			any other sprouts (clover, mixed, broccoli, daikon radish,)
L 🗆			Did you handle any sprouts, even if you didn't eat them?
м 🗆			any bagged, pre-washed lettuce or salad mix
N 🗖			any other iceberg lettuce
0 🗖			any romaine lettuce
Ρ 🗖			any other leafy lettuce (red, green, butter, radicchio)
Q 🗖			any mesclun, "spring mix", or "baby" salad items
R 🗖			any lettuce on sandwiches or burgers
s 🗖			any tomatoes on sandwiches or burgers
т 🖊		C	bagged, pre-washed spinach or spinach mix
υ□			fresh spinach ("loose"; not frozen)
V 🗆			arugula, endive, chard, watercress, other salad greens
W 🗆			other greens (kale, collard, mustard, etc)
Χ□			fresh basil or pesto (at home or away)
Υ 🗖			fresh parsley (regular or Italian)
Z 🗖			fresh cilantro

Results of Shotgun Interviews					
Age	Sex	Onset	Bagged Spinach		
27	F	8/25/06	Y		
37	М	8/25/06	Y		
17	F	8/30/06	Y		
62	F	8/31/06	Ν		
8	F	8/31/06	Y		
49	F	9/2/06	Y		







# **Binomial Calculations**

5 of first 6 cases ate bagged spinach

Spinach consumption rate was ~17%

Background	Probability
10%	0.00006
15%	0.0004
17%	0.0007
20%	0.002
25%	0.005

## Multi-State Outbreaks Evolve over Time

- States work collaboratively on ad hoc basis
- Often there is a de facto leader (or 2) but no one is really "in charge"
- Methods evolve collectively, depending on distribution of cases, who's on first, etc.
- May be successive waves of questionnaires
- CDC's role is variable

# **Sub-Cluster Analyses**

In large outbreaks, there may be sub-clusters of epi-linked cases

e.g., multiple cases at a restaurant, nursing homes, or school

CREAMY PEANUT BUTTER

ET WT. 5 LB

Bhirlinsini Fer: King But Co. 38900 Solan Road Salan, CH 44229

- Look for common suppliers and food items
- Specific analytic studies in these settings

King Nut Peanut Butter only sold by Sysco and other commercial suppliers

State	Style	Jalapeños	Serranos
MA	bagels	Y	Ν
ОН	Indian	Y	N
ТХ	Mexican	Y	N
TX	Mexican	Y	Ν
TX	Mexican	Y	N
MO	Mexican	Y	N
NC	Mexican	Y	Y
NY	Mexican	Y	Y
ТХ	Mexican	N	Y
AR	Mexican	Y	N
IL	Mexican	Y	Y
IL	Mexican	Y	Y
IL	Mexican	Y	Ν
IL	Mexican	N	N
IL	Mexican	N	Y
IL	Mexican	Y	Ν
IL	Mexican	?	?

State	Style	Jalapeños	Serranos
DC	Mexican	Y	Y
VA	Mexican	Y	Ν
MD	Mexican	Y	N
GA	Mexican	Y	N
GA	Mexican	Y	N
NY	Mexican	Y	Y
NY	Mexican	Y	N
NY	Mexican	Y	Y
NY	Mexican	Y	Y
MA	Mexican	Y	N
CO	Mexican	Y	?
PA	Mexican	?	?
MI	Mexican	Y	N
AL	Mexican	Y	N
MI	Mexican	?	?
AL	Mexican	Y	N
MN	Organic	Y	N

# Epi Data are Dirty

- Not all exposed people get sick (i.e., some well people were exposed)
- Some people get sick without being exposed
- Not all "exposed people" are really exposed
- Not all sick people are really sick
- Most people have imperfect memories of ephemeral exposures

# "Controls": Where do they come from?

- Meal companions
- Neighboring households
- Same phone-prefix households
- Credit card names
- Other reported cases with similar illnesses
- Population surveys
- "Virtual" controls



# Analytic Studies: Guilt by Association


- Comparison of exposure histories between ill and well persons ("cases" and "controls")
- Statistical testing to assess "significance"

	sick	well	total
ate tomatoes	8	5	13
didn't eat them	2	15	17
total	10	20	30
"Odds ratio" (O.f	P =	= 0.007	

# Statistical "Power"

- Same proportions; smaller sample size
- Same odds ratio; not significant

	sick	well	total
ate tomatoes	4	2	6
didn't eat them	1	6	7
total	5	8	13





Background rate of consumption is high (e.g., eggs, tomatoes)


- Risk is diffuse (e.g., dozens of peanut butter-flavored products)
- Food is "cryptic" or eaten as an ingredient (e.g., spices, tomatoes)
- Not enough interviews completed
- Interviewer variability
- Confounding

# Epidemiological Evidence: More than 2x2 Tables

- Descriptive (demographics, timing, clinical hx)
- Case series information
- Analytic study associations
- Dose-response
- Product testing
- Traceback and traceforward information
- Past history and general knowledge









#### Who Does the Epidemiology Work?

- State/local health departments conduct >95% of all enteric disease investigations
- CDC participates in a small proportion of total
- CDC is primary agency on a tiny proportion
- States do not work for the feds
- Different agencies may work at different speeds
- 1 or 2 states often set the pace on multi-state investigations

#### **Taking Public Health Action**

After weeks of little progress, investigations can suddenly move quickly


Businesses usually gets little warning that is unlikely to change...


- Epidemiologists tend to go public quickly about potentially ongoing problems
- "Mandatory recall" authority is rarely an issue
- Different agencies take a different approach
- Most investigations are never publicized





# Why do investigations take so long?


- Some delays are unavoidable
- Some delays are regrettable
- Some outbreaks are complicated
- Some investigations are difficult
- Some investigations are bungled


































































## State and Local Health Departments Vary

- Staffing, experience, and interest
- "Routine" follow-up practices
- Legal structures and state-local dynamics
- Lab capacity
- Lab-epi integration and coordination
- Interest in old and cold cases; discretionary time
- Ability to work nights and weekends
- Experience working with business
























## **Multiple Agencies Get Involved**

- Local health departments
- State health departments
- CDC
- Regulatory agencies (state and national—Ag, FDA, USDA, ...)
- Not to mention: private physicians and labs, academic institutions, business groups, the media, MarlerClark, ...

## Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.



Epidem	iologists	s vs R	eaul?	ators
сриссти	lologista		Cyu	alois

Epidemiologists	Regulators		
reactive	proactive and reactive		
have big mouths	have police powers		
do whatever they want	follow the rules		
"unlimited" jurisdiction	jurisdiction is specified		
share information freely	like to have secrets		
world is grey	black and white		
like to make a mess	like to clean up		
think they're in charge	think they're in charge		